Special Forces’ future won’t be secured by trying to out-Ranger the Rangers or out-JSOC JSOC. Its survival—and America’s advantage in strategic competition—depends on restoring the human edge: language, culture, networks, and UW tradecraft. These aren’t “soft skills”; they’re combat skills. Rebuilding them is the only way SF remains the partner of choice, the disruptor adversaries fear, and the force multiplier that makes U.S. lethality matter.
A great lay down. It seems to me the allies who can make your vision real are current SF operators, SOCOM leaders, and interagency partners who value influence; the pushback will come from the big Army, JSOC’s direct-action culture, and budget or tech voices. A practical way forward is for SF, SOCOM, and State/CIA to press together that language and culture aren’t extras—they’re combat multipliers, essential for operating in the gray area.
Thank you Mark, this has been a great reminder of where we as a regiment need to focus. I would also like to add a third leg to your stool. Language, Cultural and RELATIONSHIPS" I was the J3 for JTF-510 when we deployed to the Philippines after 9/11. The relationships that we had built over the last 15 years of working with the AFP brought us immediate relevancy. The fact that the AFP SOUTHCOM Commander, LTG Roy Cimatu was a graduate of the US Army's Command and General Staff College and had relatives in the Seattle enhanced our reception. Most of the young staff officers on his staff and in the two AFP infantry brigades on Basilan had attended one or more Army courses, Ranger School, the Special Forces Qualification Course, Airborne School and had been part of the JCET programs. Those relationships built immediate trust and emboldened them. For those of you who are unfamiliar with OEF-P, i would recommend this rand study to you: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1236/RAND_RR1236.pdf. I will point out that one of the major architects of OEF-P is missing from the report and I would like to mention him here - then MAJ Eric Wendt, his surveys were instrumental in allowing us to identify key centers of gravity on Basilan which once addressed allowed us to deny key sanctuaries to the ASG to the point where they abandoned Basilan.
If it offers any hope, this was one of the reasons I thought some of the SF members on diplomatic postings could stand out. They seemed more willing to expose themselves to culturally unfamiliar environments - which is something diplomats should do as a matter of course, but often don't. It's a pity that mainstream views of what 'operators' do came to be viewed so narrowly.
A great lay down. It seems to me the allies who can make your vision real are current SF operators, SOCOM leaders, and interagency partners who value influence; the pushback will come from the big Army, JSOC’s direct-action culture, and budget or tech voices. A practical way forward is for SF, SOCOM, and State/CIA to press together that language and culture aren’t extras—they’re combat multipliers, essential for operating in the gray area.
It sounds trite, but we need a new Bill Donovan and the backing to recreate the OSS.
Vision into capability -- if the antibodies don’t kill it first.
Thank you Mark, this has been a great reminder of where we as a regiment need to focus. I would also like to add a third leg to your stool. Language, Cultural and RELATIONSHIPS" I was the J3 for JTF-510 when we deployed to the Philippines after 9/11. The relationships that we had built over the last 15 years of working with the AFP brought us immediate relevancy. The fact that the AFP SOUTHCOM Commander, LTG Roy Cimatu was a graduate of the US Army's Command and General Staff College and had relatives in the Seattle enhanced our reception. Most of the young staff officers on his staff and in the two AFP infantry brigades on Basilan had attended one or more Army courses, Ranger School, the Special Forces Qualification Course, Airborne School and had been part of the JCET programs. Those relationships built immediate trust and emboldened them. For those of you who are unfamiliar with OEF-P, i would recommend this rand study to you: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1236/RAND_RR1236.pdf. I will point out that one of the major architects of OEF-P is missing from the report and I would like to mention him here - then MAJ Eric Wendt, his surveys were instrumental in allowing us to identify key centers of gravity on Basilan which once addressed allowed us to deny key sanctuaries to the ASG to the point where they abandoned Basilan.
If it offers any hope, this was one of the reasons I thought some of the SF members on diplomatic postings could stand out. They seemed more willing to expose themselves to culturally unfamiliar environments - which is something diplomats should do as a matter of course, but often don't. It's a pity that mainstream views of what 'operators' do came to be viewed so narrowly.