The Bridge

Technology and Partner Capacity in Irregular Warfare

Note to Readers: By this point, I suspect my readers are relieved to discover that this installment is not another descent into the swamp of American politics. Frankly, I share the relief. Instead, we’re returning to ground that’s at least slightly less contentious and considerably more useful: Special Operations—where arguments tend to be settled by evidence, experience, and the occasional sand table, not by cable news pundits. So let’s get back to a field in which I can claim more than spectator-level expertise: the craft of Special Forces in the 21st century.

Introduction – Technology in the Service of Partnership

For nearly seventy years, U.S. Army Special Forces have thrived at the intersection of people, ideas, and technology. From the OSS agents operating behind enemy lines in World War II to the Green Berets riding with Afghan horsemen in 2001, Special Forces have always fused the technical with the human. Radios, air controllers, and precision munitions have been tools—but never the center of gravity. The decisive factor has always been the credibility that comes from empowering others to fight for themselves.

In the era of strategic competition, that balance must be rediscovered. The Army’s Special Forces Regiment faces a defining challenge: how to harness emerging technologies not simply to make Operational Detachments–Alpha (ODAs) more lethal and survivable, but to make partners more capable, confident, and credible. The purpose of integrating new technology is not modernization for its own sake; it is to give partners the means to resist coercion, to act independently, and to operate alongside U.S. forces when deterrence fails. In this, the measure of success is not how much capability the ODA can wield, but how much capability it can transfer—and how enduring that capability becomes when the team leaves.

The Regiment must therefore view technology through two complementary lenses. The first is internal: ensuring ODAs retain the agility, mobility, and survivability to operate effectively in the gray zone and in potential large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The second—and increasingly decisive—is external: using technology as an instrument of credibility and influence. The ODA’s ability to identify, deliver, and sustain the right technologies for the right partners—those that are employable, maintainable, and tailored to specific environments—is what will distinguish Special Forces from all other instruments of national power in the decades to come.

---

The Role of Technology in Building Partner Capacity

Technology is no longer the exclusive domain of great powers. It is dispersed, democratized, and weaponized by state and non-state actors alike. China and Russia use it to manipulate information and logistics networks; Iran and the DPRK use it to arm proxies and disrupt regional balances. In this environment, U.S. Special Forces must act not only as combat advisors but as technological translators—bridging the gap between cutting-edge innovation and the practical needs of indigenous forces who fight daily in contested gray zones.

The heart of partner capacity building lies not in transferring equipment, but in transferring confidence. When an ODA introduces technology that a partner can actually use—something that immediately improves survivability, intelligence, or precision—that act becomes a form of strategic messaging. It demonstrates U.S. commitment more persuasively than speeches or visits. It says, “We trust you with this,” which, in many cultures, is a currency more powerful than aid dollars or promises of security.

Yet technology can also undermine trust if mishandled. Many partners request equipment that exceeds their ability to employ or sustain. Others lack the infrastructure or training base to keep systems operational beyond the first fight. The ODA’s responsibility is therefore not to deliver what a partner wants, but what they need and can sustain. That requires judgment, patience, and cultural fluency. The most effective technology transfer is one that fits seamlessly into the partner’s way of fighting and aligns with their cultural and logistical realities. Sophistication in this context is not about complexity; it is about fitness for purpose.

---

Assessing Partner Needs – The ODA as Technology Interpreter

Before technology can build credibility, it must be chosen wisely. The ODA’s first task in any theater should be to assess its partner through five questions:

1. What is the partner’s immediate threat environment?
   Are they facing hybrid warfare, insurgency, maritime coercion, or cyber manipulation? The answer shapes both the type and the scale of technology they need.

2. What is their capacity to employ and sustain technology?
   Sophisticated systems that require secure networks, advanced maintenance, or classified supply chains can fail faster than they can be fielded. Sustainability must outweigh novelty.

3. What is the partner’s operational culture?
   Does the force prize improvisation, hierarchy, or collective action? A tool that aligns with their tactical instincts will always outperform one that contradicts them.

4. What are the political and ethical constraints?
   Technology that violates regional norms or risks escalation can destroy strategic trust, no matter how effective it is tactically.

5. How does this capability connect to U.S. operational concepts?
   If deterrence fails, can this partner integrate into a U.S. or allied campaign across multiple domains—land, sea, air, cyber, and space?

Answering these questions is not an analytical exercise for headquarters; it is a field responsibility for the ODA, informed by human contact and cultural literacy. This is why language and cultural fluency are not soft skills—they are enablers of technological success. A team that cannot understand its partner’s decision-making logic cannot design an effective capability solution.

To make these judgments credible, Special Forces should develop an informal but disciplined methodology—a decision framework that weighs employability, sustainability, cultural fit, and interoperability before recommending any technological solution. That framework should be informed by operational feedback loops, not acquisition cycles, and it should emphasize why this system, not that one, is the right fit for a particular partner. The objective is not to equip partners to mirror U.S. capabilities, but to complement them—to build interoperable nodes in a distributed architecture of resistance and resilience.

---

Selecting Technologies that Matter – Fit, Function, and Trust

Some technologies are inherently more promising for partner capacity building because they combine tactical relevance, low sustainment costs, and strategic signaling value. Six categories stand out as offering the highest return on investment:

1. Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Decision Support
AI can deliver analytical precision to partners who lack large staffs or intelligence infrastructure. Lightweight AI-enabled tools for target recognition, logistics prediction, and pattern-of-life analysis can give small units strategic leverage. In Ukraine, autonomous ISR systems and machine-learning-enabled targeting have multiplied combat effectiveness without overwhelming human operators. Similar tools could empower Taiwanese coastal defense units, Jordanian counter-terror elements, or Colombian counternarcotics teams.

2. Unmanned and Autonomous Systems (UxS)
Attritable drones, unmanned ground vehicles, and low-cost maritime systems allow partners to contest space they cannot physically dominate. These platforms require minimal training and can be maintained locally, yet they deliver exponential effects. They also allow partners to project presence in domains—air and maritime—where they would otherwise be outmatched. For small island states, UxS represents sovereignty at scale.

3. Secure Communications and Mesh Networking
Resilient communications are the backbone of both irregular warfare and LSCO integration. Lightweight, encrypted mesh networks give partners the ability to coordinate under electronic attack and integrate with U.S. joint systems when required. The ability to communicate securely is not just tactical—it is psychological. It conveys that a partner can be trusted with sensitive operations, strengthening their confidence and ours.

4. Counter-UAS and Electronic Warfare Tools
Every adversary from Russia to Iran now employs drones and electronic attack in the gray zone. Delivering portable counter-UAS and EW systems helps partners protect themselves without depending on U.S. air cover. It also reduces the adversary’s cost advantage, forcing them to invest more heavily in systems that are now less effective.

5. Distributed Manufacturing and Sustainment Technologies
Field-level 3D printing, modular power systems, and local repair capacity allow partners to sustain themselves under duress. Ukraine’s ability to keep drones flying through distributed repair networks offers a model. A partner who can fix, fabricate, and adapt in contact is a partner who will not fold when logistics lines are cut.

6. Information and Influence Tools
Influence is a form of firepower in the gray zone. Equipping partners with digital media, data analytics, and counter-disinformation tools allows them to contest the narrative battlespace that precedes kinetic conflict. The Philippines’ efforts to expose Chinese maritime coercion through real-time digital reporting show how influence operations can deter aggression before escalation.

Each of these technologies meets the fundamental criteria of the “partner-first” approach: they are relevant, scalable, sustainable, and strategically useful. More importantly, they demonstrate U.S. commitment not as benefactor, but as enabler—an ally who provides the means for self-reliance.

---

Mitigating Risk – The Fine Line Between Empowerment and Exposure

While empowering partners through technology builds deterrence, it also carries risk. History offers cautionary lessons. In Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Syria, capabilities transferred to local forces were later lost, abandoned, or turned against U.S. interests. The lesson is not to withhold technology, but to apply it with discipline. The partner should never be given more capability than they can responsibly control, nor technology that, if lost, would compromise U.S. forces or allies. The ODA must constantly balance generosity with prudence, ensuring that empowerment does not become proliferation.

This requires a mindset of conditional trust—partners should feel fully supported, but ODAs must retain the awareness that loyalties shift, regimes change, and war is fluid. The art lies in providing enough to make them strong, but not so much that they become unaccountable or unmanageable. It is a tension that every generation of Special Forces has navigated since the OSS, and one that must again become part of the Regiment’s professional discipline.

---

Cultural Fluency and Technology – The Human Circuitry of Trust

No technology, however advanced, can substitute for cultural fluency. A mesh network may connect radios, but it is shared understanding that connects people. ODAs must combine technical knowledge with cultural empathy, speaking not just the language of their partners, but their operational logic. This is where the lessons of Paper 2—language mastery and cultural literacy—become operational imperatives. The best technology in the world will fail if delivered without the ability to explain its purpose, integrate it into local tactics, or respect cultural norms governing its use.

In the same way that OSS officers in occupied Europe tailored their equipment to resistance groups—simple, rugged, effective—modern Special Forces must tailor 21st-century tools to their partners’ context. This is not charity; it is strategy. Cultural fluency ensures that technology does not alienate, overwhelm, or insult. It transforms tools into trust, and trust into enduring access.

---

Toward a Methodology for Technological Engagement

A modern methodology for technology integration should begin with four principles:

First, assess before you deliver. Technology must solve the partner’s problem, not the ODA’s curiosity. Every piece of equipment should answer a clearly defined operational gap identified through partner dialogue and environmental observation.

Second, train to autonomy. The objective is not dependence on U.S. advisors, but self-sufficiency. The test of success is whether the partner can employ, maintain, and adapt the capability without U.S. supervision.

Third, align with strategy. Tactical tools must serve strategic objectives. A system that enhances partner legitimacy and deters adversaries is more valuable than one that merely increases firepower.

Finally, adapt for escalation. Technologies provided in the gray zone must be adaptable to higher-end conflict. Partners must be able to scale from peacetime deterrence to wartime integration without loss of coherence or control.

When applied consistently, these principles turn technology into a deliberate form of irregular warfare—an operational art that builds capability, influences alignment, and constrains adversary action long before conventional forces are committed.

---

Conclusion – Returning to the OSS Ethos

The future of Special Forces lies in mastering the fusion of human expertise and technological agility. The Regiment’s greatest contribution to national defense will not come from competing with conventional formations in precision fires or armored mobility. It will come from its ability to identify partners who matter, deliver the capabilities they need, and build trust that endures when communication lines are severed and deterrence fails.

This is the modern expression of the OSS ethos: adaptability, cultural acuity, and the quiet precision of enabling others to resist oppression. It is what differentiates the Green Beret from every other soldier in the American arsenal. The technology may have changed—from clandestine radios to autonomous drones and AI-enabled decision tools—but the mission remains the same: to stand beside those who fight tyranny, and to give them the means to win.

As the global competition intensifies, Special Forces must become the bridge between America’s technological ingenuity and its human allies abroad. That bridge will be built not of steel and code, but of judgment, empathy, and discipline—the timeless qualities that define the Regiment. If Special Forces can integrate technology not as a crutch but as a catalyst for partnership, it will remain the nation’s most adaptable and indispensable instrument of irregular power—able to shape the gray zone, support LSCO, and ensure that America never fights alone.