Xi's purge is important to US strategy in Asia. It isn’t about cleaning house. It’s about control. And a military trained to obey without question is a dangerous thing, especially in a Taiwan crisis.
TOAB - an interesting and thoughtful read. A consolidation of power by Xi IMO, and the removal of the last vestiges of previous CCP leader’s influence and loyalties in the senior PLA ranks, or those who support the end (unification) but not via military means (invasion, or any combination of JIOC elements).
Well written. Ending corruption is a worthy goal and great cover. Xi's purge is not unlike Stalin's purge in the late 30's and, as you mention, Marshall's efforts with our army as well. I also can't help but draw some cautionary paralleles to our current administration's call to loyalty above all else, whereby loyalty to the leader becomes the principal metric for success.
Great essay. It aligns with Elbridge Colby’s denial strategy and with the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy in treating China as a peer competitor and denial as the core of Taiwan deterrence. It adds that Xi’s purge of the People’s Liberation Army degrades professional judgment and internal restraint. This makes deterrence harder to signal and escalation harder to control. The book and the strategies assume a more self-correcting adversary. The essay warns that this assumption is weakening.
That would be my concern. I think that when you consider the narrowing capability gap between the two countries, the more aggressive unilateral posture of the US, the potential inexperience and exuberance of the new breed of Chinese generals, and Xi’s unitary leadership approach and iron fist of authority that the possibility of miscalculation on both sides is much higher than perhaps in the “good old days” of US unquestioned supremacy.
TOAB - an interesting and thoughtful read. A consolidation of power by Xi IMO, and the removal of the last vestiges of previous CCP leader’s influence and loyalties in the senior PLA ranks, or those who support the end (unification) but not via military means (invasion, or any combination of JIOC elements).
Going a little deeper on the subject: https://www.youtube.com/live/w5i61FRlGBI?si=niqVThutk3Urvroh
Well written. Ending corruption is a worthy goal and great cover. Xi's purge is not unlike Stalin's purge in the late 30's and, as you mention, Marshall's efforts with our army as well. I also can't help but draw some cautionary paralleles to our current administration's call to loyalty above all else, whereby loyalty to the leader becomes the principal metric for success.
Great essay. It aligns with Elbridge Colby’s denial strategy and with the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy in treating China as a peer competitor and denial as the core of Taiwan deterrence. It adds that Xi’s purge of the People’s Liberation Army degrades professional judgment and internal restraint. This makes deterrence harder to signal and escalation harder to control. The book and the strategies assume a more self-correcting adversary. The essay warns that this assumption is weakening.
That would be my concern. I think that when you consider the narrowing capability gap between the two countries, the more aggressive unilateral posture of the US, the potential inexperience and exuberance of the new breed of Chinese generals, and Xi’s unitary leadership approach and iron fist of authority that the possibility of miscalculation on both sides is much higher than perhaps in the “good old days” of US unquestioned supremacy.